Abstract -The minimum performance rule applies where the defendant who has repudiated his contract would have had a choice as to how to perform it. The rule requires that damages be assessed on the basis that the defendant would have chosen to perform in the least onerous manner. Two principal criticisms of the rule are made. The first is that the rule's fundamental assumption, that minimum performance is all the claimant is entitled to, rests on a flawed understanding of what it means to have a choice as to how to perform a promise. The second concerns the rule's application to consequential loss. Where the benefit of which the claimant has been deprived comprises consequential, as opposed to immediate, loss the absence of an entitlement to that benefit is not a bar to recovery, liability being limited by the doctrine of remoteness instead. The article then considers whether the rule has a continuing role in contract law. Given that those cases within its remaining area of application, being claims for the recovery of contractual benefits as to which the defendant made no promise, are not, properly considered, minimum performance cases at all, the conclusion reached is that the rule should be abandoned.
Introduction
Suppose a seller promises to deliver 100 tons of coal, 5% more or less at his option, but repudiates the contract without delivering any quantity at all. Are damages for non-delivery to be assessed on the basis of a notional delivery of 100 tons, 95 tons, 105 tons or some other quantity? Given that the 'governing' 1 principle of contract damages is that the claimant is to be placed in the same position as if the contract had been performed, 2 it might reasonably be expected that the buyer's damages would be based on the quantity within the agreed range which the seller would in fact have chosen to deliver had he not repudiated the contract. which the seller would have made has no relevance to the assessment of damages.
Regardless of the quantity he would actually have delivered had he performed the contract, the minimum performance rule dictates that damages be assessed on the basis of a notional delivery of 95 tons. For the rule holds that the claimant is 'only entitled to be compensated for the loss of those benefits which he would have been legally entitled to claim if his contract had been performed'. 3 Had the contract remained in being, the buyer could not have insisted that the seller deliver any more than 95 tons. In this way, what constitutes the floor as regards the discharge of the defendant's primary obligation to perform his promise acts as the ceiling for his secondary obligation to pay damages for non-performance.
The minimum performance rule has been said to make 'perfectly good sense' 4 and the great majority of writers seem happy enough with it. 5 Nevertheless, the view put forward in this article is that the rule represents a misconceived extension of the orthodox principle 'that no man can be held liable in contract for failing to do what he is not obliged to do'. 6 The rule will, in some cases at least, lead to an award of damages which fails to achieve that remedy's overriding purpose of placing the claimant in the same position as if the defendant had performed those promises which at the date of repudiation 7 he had an outstanding primary obligation to keep. 8 In the examination of the rule which follows, three categories of claim are identified. The first, and most significant, category comprises those claims where the defendant would have had a choice under the contract as to how to perform a promise which he had a primary obligation to keep. The second category comprises claims for the loss of an extra-contractual benefit 9 which the defendant, had he performed the contract, might have chosen to confer on the claimant. The third category consists of claims for the loss of a discretionary contractual benefit 10 which the defendant, had he performed the contract, might have chosen to confer on the claimant.
The article makes two principal criticisms of the rule. First, it challenges the validity of the rule's fundamental assumption that in claims falling within the first category, performance in the least onerous manner 'is all the claimant is legally entitled to '. 11 It is shown that this assumption rests on an inadequate understanding of what it means for the defendant to have a choice as to how to perform his promise.
For where a promise provides for alternative ways of performance, the promisee may be seen to enjoy contingent rights to each alternative, and not, as the minimum performance rule holds, merely a right to the least onerous alternative. Given that the claimant's damages should reflect 'the value of the contractual benefit to which he . 9 For present purposes, an extra-contractual benefit is one as to which the contract makes no provision and hence as to the conferral of which the defendant makes no promise in the contract. An example of a claim for an extra-contractual benefit in this context would be where the claimant alleges that, had the contract not been repudiated, the defendant would have chosen to enter into a follow-on contract with the claimant, the repudiated agreement having contained no provision for renewal. 10 In contrast to claims under the second category, the benefit involved in a claim under the third category is contractual, in the sense that the contract makes provision for the benefit. But, in contrast to claims under the first category, the provision falls short of a promise, express or implied, by the defendant as to its conferral. In other words, the contract provides that the defendant has an absolute discretion to confer or refrain from conferring the benefit. In practice, where the benefit forms a substantial element of the overall consideration, the court will be reluctant to construe the discretion as being absolute and will look to impose certain restrictions on the defendant as to its exercise: see, eg, The distinction is important because the loss of an extra-contractual benefit which the defendant might have chosen to confer on the claimant had the contract been performed constitutes consequential, and not immediate, loss. Where the benefit of which the claimant has been deprived comprises consequential loss the absence of an entitlement to that benefit is not a bar to recovery, liability for consequential loss being limited by the doctrine of remoteness instead. It follows that the minimum performance rule should not have any application to claims falling within either the first or second categories: not to the former because the claimant has a sufficient entitlement to the benefit of which he has been deprived; and not to the latter because there is no need for an entitlement to the benefit of which he has been deprived.
On the basis that these criticisms are valid, the final substantive section of the article considers whether there remains a continuing, albeit much reduced, role for the minimum performance rule. At first sight, the existence, identified above, of the third category of claim to which the rule currently applies holds out the prospect of continuing work for the rule to do. Yet, on closer consideration, it is clear that claims for the loss of a discretionary contractual benefit, that is, a benefit as to which the contract makes provision but as to the conferral of which the defendant has made no promise, are not minimum performance cases at all. For these are not cases in which the defendant's liability turns on the application of an irrebuttable presumption as to how the defendant would have chosen to perform. Where the defendant has not promised to confer a contractual benefit, the absence of liability in damages for the loss of that benefit is not dependent upon any presumption as to how the defendant would have chosen to act. Rather, the defendant is not liable for the simple reason that he did not promise to confer the benefit. The conclusion to which this reasoning leads is that the minimum performance rule should have no role in the law of contract damages.
The Defendant Would Have Had a Choice as to How to Perform His Promise
The first category, and the most common situation in which the minimum performance rule is applied, arises from the non-performance of a promise which provides on its 'face . . . for alternative methods of performance'. 13 Such a promise 13 The third variant is where the defendant promises to do one thing while having the option to substitute another: a promise to do x unless he elects to do y instead.
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For example, a theatre company may engage a variety artiste to perform his sketch at the London Palladium for three weeks, while reserving the right to transfer the engagement to a different theatre. 23 Here again the form of the assumption is modified. For in these cases the defendant is assumed to have exercised his right of substitution in the way which minimizes his liability in damages: 'if the defendant has under the contract an option which would reduce or extinguish the loss, it will be assumed that he would exercise it'. 24 Whether the defendant would in fact have exercised the option is irrelevant: all that matters is that he could have done so. Hence damages for the artiste's wrongful dismissal are assessed on the basis that his engagement would have been transferred from the Palladium to a provincial theatre at the earliest opportunity. 
A. What it Means to Have a Choice
Having a choice means having a 'bilateral' 27 right: the right to do a thing and the right to refrain from doing that thing. 28 In Hohfeldian terms, a bilateral right will be either a liberty-right or a power-right. 29 A liberty-right is 'simply the absence of a duty not to rules which are concerned directly to prescribe conduct'. 40 As such, they may be termed 'first-order' rights. 41 Power-rights, like indemnity-rights, on the other hand, 'exist on the plane of secondary rules, which are concerned not to prescribe conduct so much as to provide facilities for the alteration of prescriptions that obtain at the primary level'.
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The distinction between liberty-rights and power-rights is thus crucial where the defendant has a choice as to how to perform his promise. In such cases, the right comprises the ability of the defendant to modify the content of his own duty. 43 A liberty-right, as a first-order right, will not have a duty as its content and so a libertyright will not enable the holder to modify the content of a duty. As a matter of definition, the right enjoyed by a promisor who has a choice as to how to perform his promise must necessarily be a bilateral power-right, and not a liberty-right. As will be shown immediately below, this analysis has far-reaching consequences for the minimum performance rule.
(i) A promise to do x or y
The defendant who promises to do x or y assumes a disjunctive and indeterminate duty. 44 The choice inherent in such a promise comprises a bilateral power-right: the defendant enjoys the ability to fix the precise content of the duty. He can modify the content of the original duty, to do either x or y, into either a duty to do x or a duty to do y. It follows that by promising to do x or y the defendant assumes a contingent duty to do x and a contingent duty to do y. Depending on the choice he makes, the defendant will come under either a duty to do x or a duty to do y. If he chooses to do x, the contingent duty to do x becomes unconditional and the contingent duty to do y is extinguished. It further follows that until the defendant makes his choice, the claimant enjoys a contingent claim-right to x and a contingent claim-right to y. It is only when the defendant makes his choice to do, say, x that the claimant's contingent claim-right to x becomes unconditional and his contingent claim-right to y is extinguished. So until the charterer chooses the particular port at which the vessel is to be re-delivered, he has a contingent duty, and the owner a contingent claim-right, as regards each port within the range. It is not correct to say that the only duty and claim-right which exists is that concerning the nearest port.
In applying the minimum performance rule to a promise to do x or y, the courts treat the contract as imposing a duty on the defendant to do the less onerous alternative, say x, and conferring on him the right to do the more onerous alternative, y, instead. 45 It is implicit in their approach that the right to do the more onerous alternative, y, is a liberty-right because the claimant is said to have no right to y: '[t]he plaintiff cannot prove a contract for performance of the more onerous obligation'.
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But such an analysis does not stand up to scrutiny. A liberty-right, as a first-order norm, cannot modify a duty. A liberty-right to do y would mean that the defendant had no duty not to do y so that the doing of y would not amount to a breach of contract. Equally, it would mean that the doing of y would not affect or extinguish the duty to do x. Having chosen to do y, the defendant would nevertheless remain bound to do x. But the right to do y must be a right to do y instead of x. By recognizing that 45 The effect of the minimum performance rule is thus to re-write the contract: a promise to do x or y is treated as if it were a promise to do x or y 'whichever is the less onerous'. But such a promise does not give the defendant a choice and is not the same as a promise to do x or y. 46 Abrahams (n 13) 483 (Atkin LJ).
the defendant has the ability to modify the content of his duty, to substitute y for x, it is apparent that the defendant has a bilateral power-right, not a liberty-right.
(ii) A promise to do x, unless the promisor elects to do y instead
When we turn to a promise to do x unless the promisor elects to do y instead, it is perhaps more immediately evident that the option comprises a power-right. The defendant's duty to do x is contingent because by choosing to do y he can extinguish his obligation to do x. It follows that the claimant's claim-right to x is also contingent.
It further follows that the defendant has a contingent duty to do y, and the claimant a contingent claim-right to y. But to award damages on the basis that the defendant would have exercised the option in the way which minimizes damages when the evidence indicates that he would not have exercised the option in that way will lead to an award of compensation which is inconsistent with the overriding purpose of damages because the award will not reflect the value of the contractual entitlement of which the claimant has been deprived.
(iii) A promise to do not less than x
The proper treatment of a promise to do not less than x is less clear-cut because here different analyses are possible. As was noted above, damages for the nonperformance of a promise to deliver 200 tons 5% more or less will be calculated on the basis of a hypothetical delivery of 190 tons. 47 The effect of the rule is that the seller is treated as having no choice as to how to perform the promise. The content of is that the parties intended that the buyer be obliged to take delivery of any quantity between 190 and 210 tons, the point presumably being to give the seller control over delivery by enabling him to insist that the claimant take delivery of any quantity 48 It also sits uneasily with the actual wording of the contract: why, it might be asked, if the seller's obligation is to deliver 190 tons, does the contract explicitly refer to 200, and not 190, tons? See Thornett (n 15) 220. 49 'Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods larger than he contracted to sell, the buyer may accept the goods included in the contract and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole.' within that range. 50 On this construction the content of the original duty is indeterminate, and not fixed, with the seller having the ability, in the form of a power-right, to fix the content of the duty at any quantity between 190 and 210 tons.
It would follow that the seller had a contingent duty, and the buyer, a contingent claim-right, in respect of any quantity within that range.
The same argument holds with respect to the employer's promise to pay an annual salary of not less than £4,000. The courts treat the contract as imposing a duty of fixed content, to pay a salary of £4,000, and conferring the right, a bilateral libertyright, to pay, or refrain from paying, an additional amount. 51 But if such a construction is correct, it would follow that there would be no obligation on the employee to accept a payment which exceeds £4,000. 52 Again, it seems more likely that the parties would intend that the employee be bound to accept a sum exceeding £4,000 so as to discharge the employer's salary obligation. And again, it would follow that the employee would have a contingent claim-right to such a sum.
B. Valuing Contingent Claim-Rights
The preceding analysis demonstrates that where the defendant has a choice under the contract as to how to perform a promise which he has a primary obligation to keep, it 50 It seems that the parties to the Thornett case itself intended something different: that the seller had a duty to deliver 200 tons, the tolerance of 10 tons either way only excusing accidental variation. In other words, the seller had no choice as to the contract amount, only a margin for inadvertent error. The court nevertheless rejected this construction: see Thornett (n 15) 224. 51 Lavarack (n 3). Again, a difficulty with this construction is its consistency with the actual wording of the contract: if the employer is promising to pay a fixed sum of £4,000 the words 'not less than' are otiose. 52 Why might an employee wish to reject payment of a sum greater than that stipulated? One reason is that it would absolve him of the obligation to continue to make himself available for work without thereby being in breach of contract. Another is that acceptance of such a sum might trigger a liability to a third party, such as liability to tax (or, in these days of negative interest rates, liability to pay 'interest'). 53 A further reason to prefer the power-right construction becomes evident where the employer does pay more than £4,000 in salary. Generally, where an employee's salary is increased, the parties are assumed to have intended that the modification cannot be reversed. So, where the employer decides one year to pay £5,000, the employee's entitlement in the following year would be £5,000. But if the right to pay an additional sum is construed as a liberty-right, the salary entitlement for the following year would remain at £4,000. . 55 See The Palmea (n 7) 271 where Phillips J adds that where the claimant is unable to show on the balance of probabilities which alternative the defendant would have chosen, the claimant 'must accept that the Court will proceed on the basis of the version of possible events which is least favourable to them' (ibid). But query whether the same approach applies where, had the contract remained alive, the choice would have fallen to be made by the defendant after the date on which damages are being assessed (ie the court is dealing with a hypothetical future, rather than a hypothetical past, event otherwise arise on a wrongful termination because the parties have expressly agreed the period for which the employer is to be liable in damages for loss of salary and other entitlements. So while, when assessing damages in wrongful dismissal cases, the courts are wrong to assume that the defendant somehow chose to terminate the contract lawfully, they are right to limit the claimant's damages to the extent they do, for the simple reason that the parties agreed that the damages should be so limited.
C. Discussion
The principal refrain of those who support the application of the minimum performance rule to cases where the defendant would have had a choice as to how to perform a promise is that the rule ensures that damages accurately reflect the claimant's contractual entitlement:
The rationale for giving no damages beyond the defendant's minimum contractual obligation is that that is all the claimant is legally entitled to. Had the contract been on foot, the claimant could not have complained if the defendant had merely performed its bare contractual obligation. Had it wanted a greater legal entitlement, the claimant could have contracted for it (presumably at an increased price). But it did not do so.
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It is undoubtedly correct that the defendant who has promised to do x or y and who then performs the less onerous alternative, say, x, will have no liability for breach of contract. The claimant cannot complain that the defendant should have done y instead. But that misses the point. In the minimum performance cases damages are not being claimed because the defendant has done x. Damages are being claimed because the defendant has done nothing: he has failed to do x and he has failed to do y. Had the defendant done x, he would have no liability because he would have kept 60 Of course, not all contractual power-rights share this dual function. For example, in Withers (n 23) the power to transfer the engagement to a provincial theatre was intended to give the employer control as to the manner in which the contract was to be performed; likewise the cancellation clause in The Mihalis Angelos (n 24). In neither case was there anything to indicate that the parties also intended the provision to function so as to limit liability for breach. 61 Burrows (n 11) 151. his promise. But just because no liability arises where the defendant does x does not mean that the claimant never had any entitlement to y. Had the defendant done x, the claimant would have had no claim because his conditional entitlement, his contingent claim-right, to y would have been extinguished when the defendant chose to do x.
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The rationale for the minimum performance rule is flawed because it treats as having occurred that which has not occurred. 63 Equally, to say the claimant could have bargained for a greater entitlement also misses the point. What the claimant bargains for is performance: 'contracts are made to be performed'. 64 Where the contract gives the defendant a choice as to how to perform his promise, the claimant takes the risk that the defendant may choose to perform in the way least beneficial to the claimant.
But he also takes the chance that the defendant may choose an alternative of greater benefit to the claimant.
Awarding damages based on the non-performance of the more onerous of two alternatives will not confer a windfall on the claimant where this reflects the choice which the defendant would probably have made. For such damages merely reflect the 'actual consequences' 65 of the defendant's repudiation and give effect to the claimant's claim-right by placing him in the same position as if the contract had been performed.
There is nothing intrinsically heterodox in the principle that the content of the secondary obligation to compensate may reflect a level of performance greater than that which would have been sufficient to discharge the primary obligation to perform. 62 It may be that the contingent claim-right to y is only extinguished when the defendant does x, rather than when he chooses to do x. The parties' intentions in this regard may turn on factors such as whether the defendant is required to communicate his choice and the extent to, and time at, which the claimant may have to rely on the choice made. 63 It is helpful to compare the position where the claimant elects not to treat the defendant's repudiation as bringing performance of the contract to an end but instead seeks specific enforcement of the defendant's outstanding promises. Were a mandatory injunction to be granted compelling performance of the defendant's unperformed promise to do x or y, the order would require the defendant to do x or y. The court would not order the defendant to do x and x alone notwithstanding that it would be less onerous for him to do x. 64 The Golden Victory (n 1 way' 67 will be assessed according to how the defendant would, not could, have performed his promise. 68 Thus an employer's liability for damages for loss of a discretionary bonus will reflect the amount it would have paid the employee had the contract been performed, notwithstanding that it could have paid a lesser sum without being in breach of contract. An extra-contractual benefit is a benefit as to which the contract makes no provision and hence as to the conferral of which the defendant makes no promise, express or implied, in the contract. Confusion arises where it is claimed that the defendant's nonperformance has deprived the claimant of an extra-contractual benefit which the defendant might have chosen to confer on the claimant, most commonly through some post-contractual dealings between the parties. For example, the claimant may assert that, had the contract not been repudiated, the parties would, on its expiry, have entered into a follow-on contract, the repudiated contract making no provision for renewal. A claim for the lost benefit which the follow-on contract would have yielded will be barred by the minimum performance rule on the ground that the claimant had no entitlement to a renewal of the contract. 70 But it is clear that the absence of an entitlement should not of itself preclude recovery here for the simple reason that the loss comprises consequential loss. Put another way, liability for consequential loss
should not be subject to the minimum performance rule. In this context it is helpful to highlight the relevance of the principle that the defendant will not be liable where he cannot reasonably be regarded, taking account of the commercial background and general expectations in the particular market, as having assumed liability for a given kind of loss. 73 
Conclusion
In those cases in which the defendant would have had a choice under the contract as to how to perform a promise which, at the time of repudiation he had an outstanding primary obligation to keep, the courts are wrong to treat the claimant as having no right to anything beyond minimum performance. While a presumption that the defendant would have performed the promise in the least onerous manner may represent a helpful and natural starting point for the assessment of damages, its elevation into an irrebuttable presumption operates so as to deprive the claimant of potentially valuable contingent claim-rights. For it is not correct as a matter of conceptual analysis to say that the claimant never had any greater entitlement.
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Where the defendant repudiates the contract before choosing how to perform, the 84 In other words, by providing that the defendant had a liberty-right as regards the benefit, the contract makes clear that the defendant has no duty to confer the benefit. To award damages for the loss of the benefit would be inconsistent with what the parties had agreed. 85 Where the choice comprises the right to do more of the same (ie a promise to do not less than x), it may be correct to construe the provision as giving the claimant no more than a right to the minimum, although, as noted above, this would not strictly be a case where the defendant has a choice as to how to perform his promise. In any event, for the reasons discussed above (see text accompanying n 48), it is suggested that in most cases a construction more likely to reflect the parties' intentions is that the claimant has contingent claim-rights to each of the possible alternatives.
claimant will have had, at the time of the repudiation, potentially valuable contingent claim-rights to each lawful alternative means of performance. The overriding compensatory purpose of contract damages requires the court to value those rights.
This should be treated as a question of fact, 'a matter of evidence', 86 and not a question of law to be determined by the application of an irrebuttable presumption.
Damages based on how the defendant would, rather than could, have chosen to perform the promise neither penalize the defendant nor confer a windfall on the claimant. Equally the minimum performance rule should have no application to claims for the loss of an extra-contractual benefit which the defendant might have chosen to confer. While recovery for the loss of such a benefit may be precluded on the ground that the defendant cannot reasonably be regarded as having assumed liability for such a loss, the absence of any entitlement on the claimant's part to the benefit should not of itself be a bar. And while the courts are right to refuse claims for the loss of a contractual benefit as to the conferral of which the defendant made no promise, these cases have nothing to do with the principle of minimum performance.
Recovery is barred simply because the defendant had no relative primary obligation:
there is no need for any presumption as to how the defendant would have chosen to act.
The conclusion to which this discussion therefore inevitably leads is that the minimum performance rule has no role in contract damages. It can, and should, be abandoned.
